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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD S. SANDERS and ELEANOR
SANDERS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

15515

DONNE. CASSITY, Trustee, et al.,

)
Defendants-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
HAROLD S. SANDERS and ELEANOR SANDERS

INTRODUCTION
The parties will be referred to herein either by name
or in their respective capacities before the Court--Harold

s.

Sanders and Eleanor Sanders, Respondents-Plaintiffs, Donn E.
Cassity, Trustee, Appellant-Defendant.
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendants, Donn E.
Cassity, Trustee, and others seeking a declaration by the Court
that the conveyance of a homestead interest in property transferred title thereto to Plaintiffs-Sanders free and clear of a
judgment lien and that title thereto should be quieted in favor
of the transferees of the judgment debtor.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge James S. Sawaya granted Plaintiffs, Harold S.
Sanders and Eleanor Sanders a Judgment on the Pleadings upon
their first cause of action, reasoning that the Plaintiffs,
as the grantees of Leoda A. Dunham, had acquired her homestead
interest in the real property that is the subject matter of
this action, subject to a life estate in favor of Leoda S.
Dunham, and free and clear of the judgment of Donn E. Cassity,
Trustee.

The Court further reasoned that since the interest

conveyed by Dunham to Sanders involved her homestead, the interest acquired by the Sanders was free and clear of any claim
or interest in Donn E. Cassity, Trustee, as provided by Section
28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the ruling of the lower
Court determining that the conveyance to the Plaintiffs-Sanders,
being the homestead interest of Leoda S. Dunham, resulted in a
transfer of the property free and clear of the judgment lien
of Donn E. Cassity, Trustee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reference to Plaintiff's Amended Conplaint, Defendant's
Counter-Claim and Cross Complaint and Plaintiff's Reply to Counte
Claim and other portions of the record are hereinafter ref erred
to as "T" followed by the page number in the transcript wherein
the pertinent portion appears .
. 2.
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On or about the 17th day of May, 1971, Appellant-DefendantCassity, obtained a judgment against Leoda S. Dunham in the
principal sum of $11,549.43, together with costs of suit.
(T-10-13, and 19-25)
On or about the 1st day of August, 1972, AppellantDefendant-Cassity caused to be issued out of the office of the
Clerk of Summit County, an execution, whereby and wherein the
sheriff of Summit County was directed to levy and execute upon
the property of Defendant Leoda Dunham.

Thereafter, the sheriff

of Summit County caused to be posted a Notice of Sale, whereby
and wherein the property that is the subject matter of this
action was noticed for sale on the 13th day of Septelllber, 1972
at the hour of 1:00 p.m.

(T-11,12, 19 and 20)

The sheriff's

sale did not occur.
On or about the 10th day of September, 1972, Leoda

s.

Dunham filed a Declaration of Homestead asserting a claim and
execption in the amount of $4,600.00 for herself and her brother.
Said declaration further contained her statement that the value
of the real estate subject to the homestead declaration, which
is the subject property in this matter, was $3,600.00.

Said

declaration was recorded on the 11th day of September, 1972,
in the office of the Summit County Recorder.

(T-12,20 and 32)

Nothing was filed by Appellant-Defendant-Cassity or
the sheriff of Summit County to indicate that the value placed
upon the property by its owner, Leoda S. Dunham, was incorrect,
. 3.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

understated or excessive.
On or about the 29th day of November, 1972, Leoda

s.

Dunham, as granter, conveyed by Quit-Claim Deed to RespondentsPlaintiffs-Sanders, the subject property, reserving in herself
a life estate.

Said deed of conveyance was thereafter recorded

in the office of the Summit County Recorder.

(T-60)

Respondents assumed the then existing outstanding
mortgage on the property in favor of Karnas State Bank in the
amount of $1,991.20, which amount has been fully discharged by
the Respondents-Plaintiffs.

(T-42-47)

On or about the 11th day of November, 1976, Appellantdefendant-Cassity, caused to be issued out of the office of the
Summit County Clerk, an execution, whereby and wherein the sherif
of Summit County was commanded to execute and levy ·upon the unexempt personal and real property of Loeda S. Dunham in an
amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment of May 17, 1971.
(T-3,12,23,32)
A sheriff's sale was held on December 7, 1976.
Appellant-Defendant bid the entire amount of his judgment for
the interest of Leoda

s.

Dunham in and to the property that is

the subject of this action.

(T-12,24,33)

On or about the 25th day of April, 1977, RespondentsPlaintiffs-Sanders, filed suit aqainst Appellant-Defendant and
others seekinq declaratory relief and a judgment quietinq title
in the Respondents.

(T-1)
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The Trial Court granted Respondents-Plaintiffs Judgment on the Pleadings on the first cause of action of their
Amended Complaint.

(T-64)

Appellant-Defendant-Cassity thereafter filed a Motion
to Reconsider and to Amend Findings of Fact.
denied on October 17, 1977.

The Motion was

(T-94)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT-DONN CASSITY'S JUDGMENT AGAINST LEODA
S. DUNHAM WAS NOT SUPERIOR TO THE HOMESTEAD
INTEREST OF LEODA S. DUNHAM AND THE CONVEYANCE
OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY FROM DUNHAM TO RESPONDENTSSANDERS TRANSFERRED HER HOMESTEAD INTEREST FREE
AND CLEAR FROM THE JUDGMENT LIEN OF CASSITY.
The judgment lien of Defendant-Donn E. Cassity did not
attach to the homestead interest of Leoda

s.

Dunham.

Section 28-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
provides, in part:
"A Homestead . . • shall be exempt from judgment
lien and from execution or forced sale, except
upon the following 0bligations:
(1) taxes
accruing and levied thereon; (2). judgments
obtained by debts secured by lawful mortgage
on the premises and on debts created for the
purchase price thereof; and (3) judgments
obtained by an appropriate party on debts
created for failure to provide support or
maintenance for dependent children." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the foregoing statute, the homestead declaration
filed by Leoda S. Dunham on September 10, 1972, exempted the
property that is the subject matter of this action from " .
judgment lien and execution of forced sale .

.

."

(emphasis suppl!ei'.

The only way in which the Defendant-Cassity's lien could be
asserted as against the homestead of Leoda S. Dunham would be
as one of the three exceptions found in Section 28-1-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

However, the judgment of

Defendant-Cassity was not the result of taxes accruing and levi~
thereon.

Nor was the judgment of Defendant-Cassity a judgment
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obtained for debts secured by a lawful mortgage on the premises
or a debt created for the purchase price of the property.

Finally,

the judgment of Cassity was not based upon debts created for
failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
Since the judgment of Defendant-Cassity was not within the three
statutory exceptions, the property to which the homestead
declaration applied was not subject to the judgment lien of
Defendant-Cassity.
Defendant-Appellant-Cassity in his brief asserts that a
judgment docketed before a homestead is declared, created a
judgment lien which is a valid lien under the provisions of
U.C.A. 78-23-3, is not affected by a subsequent homestead declaration.

He further cites the case of Mc Murdie v. Chugg, 107 P.

2nd 163 (Utah

19~0)

as supporting that position.

A review of the

statute and case cited, clearly demonstrates that DefendantAppellant' s reliance is unfounded.

In Mc Murdie the judgment ob-

tained in the lower Court was based upon notes representing the
balance due on the purchase of land and water stock together
with attorney's fees for bringing the action.
The judgment arose out of debts created for the purchase
price of the property in question.

In short, the judgment in

Mc Murdie was within the second exception found in Section 28-1-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

In the instant case, the Defendant-

Appellant' sjudgment did not meet any of the three exceptions found
in the Homestead Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In Mc Murdie, the specific issue before the Court
was whether or not the homestead statute was in conflict with
the Utah Constitution because of the exceptions to the homestead exemption contained in the homestead statute enacted by
the legislature.

This Court, in that case, drew the same

distinction that is applicable to this case and said at page
165:
"There is a great difference in protecting one's
homestead to which he has acquired clear title
from sale on execution for later incurred
obligations and in providing that a buyer is
not entitled to a homestead exemption until
he has fully paid the purchase price for the
homestead."
And, this Court, in the same case, citing Harris v.
Larsen, 24 Utah 139, stated:
"We see no reason now for changing our ruling
that a purchaser may not claim a homestead
exemption to defeat the vendor's lien. To hold
that he might do so would enable purchasers
of land to deceive and defraud innocent sellers
by relying on homestead rights as a defense
to the payment of a just debt or obligation for
the purchase of said land.
107 U. 2d at pages
165 and 166.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant-Appellant, Donn Cassity was not the seller
of the property to Leoda Dunham.

The judgment of Defendant-

Cassity did not arise out of an obligation created for the
purchase of the subject property.

To the contrary, Defendant-

Cassity's judgment is the result of twenty three years of unmerciful harassment

of Leoda S. Dunham by Defendant-Donn CassitY

trustee and his predecessors, which harassment

results from an

. 8.
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1

auto accident wherein a judgment was obtained against the
husband of Leoda S. Dunham in the cases of Fred B. Garret and
Bruce R. Sizemore vs. George R. Dunham, and the case of James
L. Barker, Jr., Trustee vs. George R. Dunham and Leoda

s.

Dunham, Case No. 3085, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 9012,
filed July 2, 1959 cited at 342 P. 2d 867,

(1959)

Donn E. Cassity, Trustee vs. Leoda S. Dunham, District Court
of Summit County Case No. 3977.
This Court further cited the Utah cases of:

Evans v.

Jensen, 51 Utah 1, 168 P. 762 and Brown v. Cleverly, 96 Utah
120, 85 P. 2d 769 as demonstrating the kinds of exceptions from
the homestead exemption that are recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court.
case.

None of those exceptions are present in the instant
In fact, a reasonable reading of the Mc Murdie case

relied upon by Appellant, clearly demonstrates that this Court
agrees with the position of Plaintiff-Respondents that the judgment lien of Donn E. Cassity was of no force and effect as
against the homestead interest of Leoda

s.

Dunham because it

did not fall within the statutory exceptions to the homestead
exemption found in Section 28-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Appellant-Defendant-Cassity next cites the California
case of Schuler-Knox Co. v. Smith, 144 P. 2d 47 (Calif. 1944)
as supporting the assertion that a judgment lien will defeat
a homestead interest.
not a Utah statute.

That case involved a California statute,
That case involved the question of whether

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or not an inferior court of limited jurisdiction had the jurisdiction to render the judgment there in question.

Although there!

was a homestead declaration filed, it did not comply with the
requirements of the California statute.

Therefore, the effect

of the homestead was never considered by the Court.

As the

California Court stated:
"Since a valid declaration of homestead was not
recorded until after the abstract of the judgment
in the Justice Court had been recorded and that
the homestead was subsequently abandoned by the
absolute transfer of title by deed of the spouses,
we are of the opinion it is unnecessary to determine the effect of the claim of homestead right
upon Plaintiff's title or right of possession
under the execution sale." 144 P. 2d 47 at page
54.
(Emplasis supplied.)
In the instant case, there is no defect in the homestead
declaration of Leoda

s.

Dunham.

There was in the Schuler-Knox

case.
In the instant case there was no abandonment of the
homestead of Leoda S. Dunham.

In Schuler-Knox there was.

Not only is the case not in point, it is distinguishable
on its facts from the case at bar.
Finally, Defendant-Appellant-Cassity, in his argument,
completely ignores the effect of Section 28-1-10, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which allows the filing of a declaration of
homestead to be made "

.

. before the time stated in the noti~

of sale on execution, or on other judicial sale, as the time of
sale, or premises in which the homestead is claimed

"

Th US

it can be seen from reading the foregoing statute that a declarat:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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can be made before the "time of sale".

To accept Defendant-

Cassity's argument would require that the declaration be made
prior to the time that the judgment becomes a lien.

If that

were the case, to be safe, a person would be required to file
a declaration of homestead at the time he acquired an interest
in property.
If he did not file such a declaration until a judgment
was rendered against him, under Defendant's reasoning, it would
mean that he could no longer assert such an exemption.

If the

legislature had intended such a result, they would have required
a filing "prior to judgment" rather than before the time stated
in the notice "as the time of

sale"~

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully subrnitted that the position asserted by Defendant-AppellantCassity is not only contrary to the statutes of the State of
Utah relating to homesteads, but is contrary to the intrepretive
decisions of this Honorable Court and is not supported by
the authorities relied upon by said Defendant in his brief.

,I

I

.11.
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POINT II
THE CONVEYANCE FROM LEODA DUNHAM TO PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-SANDERS WITH A RETAINED
LIFE ESTATE WAS A CONVEYANCE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 28-1-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AND OPERATED TO TRANSFER TITLE TO THE
SANDERS FREE AND CLEAR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTCASSITY' S JUDGMENT LIEN.
Section 28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
as follows:
"When a homestead is conveyed by the owner
thereof such conveyance shall not subject
the premises to any lien or encumbrance to
which it would not be subject in the hands
of the owner; and the proceeds of the sale
thereof, to the amount of the exemption
existing at the time of sale, shall be
exempt from execution or other process for
one year after the receipt thereof by the
person entitled to the exemption."
(Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Plaintiff-Respondents' first argument, the property of Leoda Dunham was not subject to the judgment lien of
Defendant-Cassity because of the effect of Section 28-1-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.

Since the conveyance by Dunham to Sanders

was a conveyance of a protected homestead interest, the effect
of Section 28-1-1 was to transfer the property to PlaintiffsSanders, free and clear of Defendant-Cassity's judgment lien.
As indicated in the record, Leoda Dunham had no other interest
to convey.

The totalinterest she had in the property was subject

to he.r homestead declaration.

She owned an undivided one-half

interest in the subject property with the Defendant-Cassity
.12.
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owning the other undivided one-half interest as a result of the
judgment earlier obtained against her deceased husband, George.
That undivided one-half interest was valued at $3600.00.
homestead exemption was worth $4600.00.

Her

When she conveyed

to the Plaintiffs-Sanders approximately two months after the
date of her declaration, she had no interest to convey other
than her homestead property.
Defendant-Appellant-Cassity's assertion that the
conveyance by Dunham to Sanders with a retained life estate
operated to extend the judgment lien of Cassity to the property
transferred to the Sanders is contrary to the homestead laws
~nd

contrary to the general principles of property law.

As

stated by this Court in In Re Mower's Estate, 73 P.2d 967
(Utah 1939) , homestead laws should be liberally construed to
make their application effective for the dependent and helpless
. to insure them shelter and support . . • . "

The effect

of Defendant's argument would require that a person who has
preserved a homestead right must not convey that property right
or any portion thereof at some later date because such a conveyance would change that right from a protected to a nonprotected status.
Such an argument completely ignores the plain language,
meaning and purpose of Section 28-1-2 because it would not
extend the homestead protection to a grantee such as Plaintiffs-

.13.
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Sanders.

The purpose of the homestead exemption is for the

protection of those in jeopardy of losing everything to a
judgment debtor.

Its basic intent cannot be to restrict the

alienability of property, something abhorrent to American Law.
If Leoda Dunham wished to convey all or a part of what she
owned, that is her right, and the law cannot be heard to
gainsay this type of conveyance.

Therefore, the fact that

she conveyed away her entire interest in and to the property,
reserving therein only a life estate in herself, is not only
consistent with the general policy converning homestead exemptions, i.e. to preserve something for the judgment debtor,
but also to protect that something against the judgment creditor
and to allow the judgment debtor to transfer the same without
the· disability of the judgment·being attached thereto.

To

hold otherwise would mean that a homestead exemption is valueless.

This is not the intent of the Utah homestead statutes

and is specifically sanctioned by Section 28-1-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
Appellant-Defendant relies upon the California case
of Arighi v. Rule & Sons, 107 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1940) as support
for the proposition that the reservation of a life estate did
not constitute the conveyance of the homestead property.

How-

ever, in his memorandum, found at T-91-93, Defendant-Cassity
has proposed that the act of conveyance by Dunham to Sanders

.14.
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was an act which terminated her homestead.

In the Arighi case

the California Supreme Court was, in that case, construing
the California statute describing what "abandonment of a
homestead exemption" meant in California for purposes of
enabling certain lien holders to reach the homestead property.
Since Utah has no similar abandonment statute, the case is
not in point.

Further, that case deals with California statutes

and is distinguishable on that basis alone.

More importantly,

Defendant-Cassity has failed to recognize the basis for the
Court's decision in Arighi.

California's policy is the same

as Utah's, i.e. to protect the same class of people that the
Utah statutes are designed to protect.

Had the California

Court in Arighi construed the grant in fee to the children
of the judgment debtor as being an abandonment of the homestead,
the judgment creditors could have levied upon the property and
deprived the occupants of any interest in the property.

In

that case, as in the case at bar, the judgment creditor further
argued that the conveyance to third persons by the judgment
debtor was void as against the judgment creditor.

However,

that Court disregarded that contention and concluded that the
only rights a judgment creditor would have as against the person
receiving the conveyance of a homestead exemption would be for
any proceeds in excess of the amount of the exemption .

. 15.
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It is therefore submitted that not only is the
Arighi case distinguishable from the standpoint that it
specifically dealt with the question of abandonment of a
homestead under California law, but is also factually distinguishable.

Further, that case is also contrary to the argu-

ment Defendant-Cassity makes in this case in that Arighi specifically points out that the homestead right is not an estate
in land, but is a constitutional and statutory right.

That

right should be protected by this Court in the case at bar.
Finally, this Court, in Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P.2d 486 (1949)
has held that it is not necessary to specifically refer to the
homestead interest at the time of conveyance.

In the instant

case, Leoda Dunham had no other interest to convey and the
trial court correctly concluded that the conveyance in question
was protected by Section 28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and should therefore be sustained .
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
VALUE OF THE INTEREST CONVEYED TO PLAINTIFFSRESPONDENTS-SANDERS WAS LESS THAN THE VALUE
OF LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD AND WAS BASED
UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
COURT.
Both parties moved for summary judgment or in the
alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.

Both parties

therefore asserted that there was no genuine material issue
of fact

in dispute.

(T-38

& 49)

Appellant-Defendant-Cassity now asserts that there
was a dispute as to the value of the property at the time of
conveyance.

Such an assertion is without merit.

The homestead

declaration filed by Leoda Dunham in September of 1972, only
two months prior to the conveyance, stated the value of her
undivided one-half interest to be $3600.00.
was before the trial court.

This declaration

There was no contrary evidence

presented by Defendant-Cassity.

The value of Leoda Dunham's

property interest at the time of the conveyance was not questioned by either the Defendant-Cassity or the executing officer.
They apparently agreed with her statement of value.

Had they

not agreed they could have proceeded under Section 28-1-16,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for appraisal in the
event of dispute over the value of a homestead.
so proceed.

They did not

Certainly the Sheriff of Summit County, being

.17.
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the selling officer at such sales, would have great familiarity
with property values and their selling price.

The fact that

he accepted the statement of Leoda Dunham concerning the value
of the property further supports her appraisal of the value
of the property at the time of the conveyance.

This Court in

a series of cases has held that an owner of realty is competent to give an opinion as to its value.

In Provo Water

User's Association v. Carlson, et al., 103 Utah 93 (1943),
this Court stated:
"An owner of property is always entitled
to testify as to its value in condemnation
proceedings. An owner does not have to
qualify as an expert, nor be engaged in buying
or selling rea;l estate."
Although the foregoing decision has been modified by this Court's
decision in Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 216
(1976), the general principle of the Provo Water User's Association is still the law.

This position is also supported by

Rule 56 of the Rules of Evidence adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court effective July 1, 1971.

See also State of Utah by and

through its Road Commission v. Dillree, 478 P.2d 507

(1970).

As is stated by Appellant-Defendant Cassity in his brief at
page 19, the only evidence of value before the Court was the
verified statement of Leoda Dunham.
assertion of value.

There was no opposing

The question of value was not in dispute .
. 18.
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The verified statement of Dunham was made more than five years
before the date of decision in the instant case.
before the instant lawsuit was ever considered.

It was made
There was

no reason for her to state anything other than the true value
of her property.

The Sheriff accepted her statement.

did the Defendant-Donn E. Cassity.
years.

So

He did nothing for five

He could have insisted on an appraisal back in 1972

when the property was valued and when Cassity's execution and
attempted levy was fresher.

However, the Defendant-Cassity

apparently preferred to do nothing, to sit back, to accept the
value as filed with the Court, and await until sometime in the
future when the appreciation due to inflation and increased
property values might raise the value of the property beyond
the homestead exemption and therefore, subject to execution for
the excess.

It is respectfully submitted that the trial court

had sufficient competent evidence of value before it at the
time of its decision.

The value had been accepted by the

Defendant-Cassity through his inaction or acquiescence.

He

should therefore be estopped after more than five years of
doing nothing to assert a contrary position.

See Pfister v.

Cow Gulch, 189 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1952).
Appellant attempts to manufacture a dispute as to
value by referring to the agreement of Plaintiffs-Respondents.19.
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Sanders.

(T-42 & 45)

In his brief he attempts to guess the

reasons for the purchase of the property by Plaintiffs-Sanders.
He completely ignores the effect of a one-half undivided
interest in the subject property by himself and the reduction
in value that is represented by the prospects of a partition
suit to divide the property.

He completely ignores the effect

on value that more than 23 years of protracted litigation may
have had on the value of the property.

He erroneously assumes

that the Sanders would not have agreed to acquire the interest
of Leoda Dunham if her interest in the property was worth only
$3600.00.

The Sanders were familiar with the property.

had known Leoda Dunham for more than 20 years.

They

They were

familiar with the many years of unrelenting pursuit by the
Defendant-Cassity and his predecessors in interest to acquire
the entire property.

They were aware of the fact that Leoda

Dunham could no longer pay the mortgage on her property
and was facing the prospects of losing the only thing she had
left in the world, her home, and going on welfare.

They

therefore agreed to purchase her interest, relieve her of
those burdens and hoped to secure for her a place to live in
her old age without endless pursuit by Defendant-Cassity.
Defendant-Appellant's reliance upon the agreement between
Dunham and Sanders is therefore totally without merit .
. 20.
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Defendant-Appellant-Cassity in Points IV, V and VII
of his brief makes certain technical arguments that are not
material to the disposition of this case.
no authority for his assertions.

Indeed, he cites

With regard to Appellant-

Cassity's argument at Point V, this Court's attention is directed
to the record and Point III of Respondents-Sanders brief and the
argument therein contained.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Respondents-Sanders respectfully submit that
the decision of the Trial Court was correct in all respects.
The matter was submitted by both parties on Motions indicating
no dispute as to any material fact.

The Trial Court was.in a
The Trial Court had

proper position to grant either Motion.

before it competent, undisputed evidence of the value of the
subject property at the time of the homestead declaration and
conveyance approximately two months later.

The Trial Court

correctly ruled that the conveyance by Leoda Dunham to PlaintiffsSanders was the conveyance of the homestead interest of Leoda
Dunham.

And, since the undisputed value of the property trans-

ferred was less

th~n

her homestead at the time of the conveyance,

the property passed to Plaintiffs-Sanders free and clear of the
judgment of Defendant-Appellant-Cassity.
The judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

..
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BILL THOMAS PETERS
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Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents·
Sanders
220 South 200 East
400 Chancellor Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
531-7575
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid,
to James B. Tadje, Defendant-Appellant's attorney, at 136 South
Main, Suite 404, Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

on the 14th day of February, 1978.
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